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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS




We are soon coming to the end of an era in monetary policy making in the United
States. Because extending his term beyond 2006 would require a change in the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, Alan Greenspan will be stepping down from the chairmanship of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve next year. Under his leadership, the Fed-
eral Reserve has achieved extraordinary economic performance: inflation has become
low and stable and is now consistent with Greenspan’s famous definition of price sta-
bility: when “households and businesses need not factor expectations of changes in the
average level of price in their decisions” [Greenspan, 1994]. Conquering inflation was
not done at the cost of higher output fluctuations. Output volatility has fallen and for the
close to twenty years of Greenspan’s tenure, the economy has experienced only two
relatively mild recessions in 1990-91 and in 2001. It is no wonder that Alan Greenspan
was given the title of “maestro” in Bob Woodward’s [2000] well-known book.
Even though it is hard to imagine the Federal Reserve without Greenspan, we need
to contemplate what the Federal Reserve will be like after Greenspan is gone. In this
address, I will first describe the hallmarks of the Greenspan Fed and the advantages of
this strategy that have produced such favorable economic outcomes. Then I will look at
how well the Fed might do after Greenspan and what challenges it might face. This
discussion will then lead naturally to suggestions for how the Fed should operate in the
future to continue the excellent performance it has achieved under Alan Greenspan.
HALLMARKS OF THE GREENSPAN FED
There are three key elements of the monetary policy strategy of the Federal
Reserve under Greenspan. First is the development of a strong nominal anchor, although
this anchor is not announced explicitly, but rather is implicit. Second is monetary
policy that is both forward looking and preemptive. Third is increasing transparency.
A Strong Implicit but not Explicit Nominal Anchor
One of the most important lessons learned both from the theoretical literature on
monetary policy and from actual experience is that having a strong nominal anchor, a
constraint on policy which ties down inflation expectations, is critical to the success of318 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
monetary policy. By tying down inflation expectations, a nominal anchor helps move
the economy toward the efficient frontier of the trade-off between inflation and output
gap variability, generating better performance on both the inflation and the output
fronts.1 Another way of thinking about this is that a strong nominal anchor helps the
markets to do a lot of the work for the monetary authorities. Households and busi-
nesses will be less likely to push up wages and prices, which would produce an infla-
tionary spiral, if they are convinced that there will be future monetary policy actions
to contain inflation. Furthermore, their spending is less likely to get over-exuberant
when the economy strengthens because they know the monetary authorities will take
future actions to keep the economy from overheating.
The second major benefit of a strong nominal anchor is that it is able to limit the
time-inconsistency problem first articulated by Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Calvo
[1978], and then applied to the conduct of monetary policy in Barro and Gordon [1983].
The time-inconsistency problem arises because there are incentives for a policy maker,
particularly because of pressure from politicians, to try to exploit the short-run trade-
off between employment and inflation to pursue short-run employment objectives,
even though the result is poor long-run outcomes. Expansionary monetary policy will
produce higher growth and employment in the short run and so policy makers acting
under discretion will be tempted to pursue this policy even though it will not produce
higher growth and employment in the long run because economic agents adjust their
wage and price expectations upward to reflect the expansionary policy. Unfortunately,
however, expansionary monetary policy will lead to higher inflation in the long run,
with its negative consequences for the economy.
A nominal anchor can help to prevent the time-inconsistency problem by provid-
ing a constraint on discretionary monetary policy, so that the monetary policy authori-
ties avoid the time-inconsistency trap. The commitment to a nominal anchor will help
prevent them from acceding to pressure to exploit the short-run trade-off between
employment and inflation with expansionary monetary policy, so that inflation is less
likely to spin out of control.
Over time the Greenspan Fed has demonstrated its strong commitment to price
stability both through its actions and rhetoric. In his speeches, Greenspan continually
emphasizes that the Fed is firmly committed to the price stability goal and is willing to
take actions to achieve it. In addition, when the Fed has concerns about inflationary
pressures building up in the economy, it has taken actions to raise interest rates, and
similarly has lowered interest rates when it worries that deflationary forces may
come to the fore. The result of these actions and words is that the markets perceive
the nominal anchor to be a strong one. However, the nominal anchor is implicit, not
explicit. The Federal Reserve has not come out and announced or articulated an explicit
goal for inflation, and Greenspan has been opposed to doing so (see Meyer [2004a]). At
the present time, the public (and maybe even members of the FOMC) are not sure
what the Fed’s numerical goal for inflation is: whether it is 0, 1, 2 percent or possibly higher.
Forward-Looking and Preemptive Monetary Policy
Monetary policy affects the economy with long lags: estimates for the United
States suggest that monetary policy takes around a year to affect output substantially319 THE FED AFTER GREENSPAN
and over two years to have a significant impact on inflation. The presence of long lags
means that monetary policy cannot wait to respond to inflation and output move-
ments only after they appear. If the central bank waited until overt signs of inflation
appeared, it would already be too late to maintain stable prices, at least not without a
severe tightening of policy: inflation expectations would already be embedded in the
wage- and price-setting process, creating an inflationary momentum that would be
hard to halt. Similarly, if the monetary authorities wait until deflation sets in before
lowering interest rates, they are likely to get into a deflationary trap as occurred in
Japan (for example, see Ito and Mishkin [2004]). Because nominal interest rates can-
not go below zero (the zero lower bound problem), if expectations of deflation become
prevalent, real rates will necessarily be high and conventional monetary policy mea-
sures to lower interest rates to stimulate the economy are no longer effective.
To prevent inflation or deflation from getting started, monetary policy thus needs
to be forward looking and preemptive: that is, depending on the lags from monetary
policy to inflation, monetary policy needs to act long before inflationary or deflation-
ary pressures appear in the economy. Under Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve
has done exactly that. The Fed raised interest rates from 3 to 6 percent from Febru-
ary 1994 to February 1995 when the economy began strongly to recover from the
1990-91 recession even though the economy still had some slack and inflation was not
rising. As a result, inflation not only did not rise, but fell slightly. In January 2001, the
Fed reversed course extremely rapidly, cutting the federal funds rate by 100 basis
points (1 percentage point) in January, from 6.5 to 5.5 percent even before the busi-
ness cycle peak in March, and then proceeded to cut the fed funds rate by another 350
basis points before the end of November when the NBER declared that a recession
had indeed occurred. The recession then turned out to be very mild, especially given
the adverse shocks of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the negative impacts of
the Enron and other corporate scandals on the credit markets. Recently, the Fed
started another tightening cycle in June 2004, and by February 2005 has raised the
federal funds rate from 1 to 2.5 percent in the face of continuing weak job growth.
Increasing Transparency
Before Greenspan, the Federal Reserve was generally a secretive institution. Not
only did it not clarify what its objectives and strategies were, but it kept the markets
guessing about what were the actual setting of policy instruments. The Fed was per-
fectly happy to cultivate a mystique as a wise but mysterious institution, leading to
popular books about the Fed with titles like The Secrets of the Temple [Greider, 1987].
Under Greenspan, this began to change dramatically. In February 1994, the Fed began
to announce the target for the federal funds rate decided at the FOMC meeting. In
1999, it began to announce the FOMC’s decision about the “bias” toward which direc-
tion monetary policy was likely to go, later expressed as the balance of risks in the
economy. In 2002, the Fed started immediately to report the roll call vote on the
federal funds rate target taken at the FOMC meeting. Starting in August 2003, the
Fed began to announce what the likely future path for the federal funds rate would be.
In August 2003, the FOMC announced that it would maintain policy accommodation of
its very low federal funds rate target of 1 percent for a “considerable period.” In January320 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
2004, the FOMC modified its language to say that it would be “patient” in removing
policy accommodation and then in May 2004 to say that policy accommodation can be
removed at a pace that is likely to be “measured,” leading to a continuing increase of
the federal funds rate of 0.25 percent (25 basis points) at every subsequent FOMC
meeting. Most recently, in December 2004, it moved up the release date of the min-
utes of FOMC meetings to three weeks after the meeting from a previous six weeks.
Thus the Fed has increased its transparency in recent years. Yet even today, the Fed
is not fully transparent: it does not publish its forecasts of the economy, nor its target
for the inflation rate, as many other central banks do.
ADVANTAGES OF THE GREENSPAN STRATEGY
The Greenspan approach to monetary policy has several advantages that help
explain its success.
Increasing Fed Credibility
Through its actions and words, the Fed has been able to increase the credibility
over time of its commitment to price stability. This has led stable inflation expecta-
tions in the current economic environment and is one reason why the inflation rate
has become so stable. This success was, however, not immediate, as is illustrated by
events in the bond market. In the past, when the Fed raised interest rates, markets
interpreted this as an indication that the Fed was more concerned about the potential
for a surge in inflation in the future and it was far from clear that the Fed would be
successful in containing inflation. As a result, the inflation premium in long-term
interest rates would rise, thereby driving up long rates at the same time the fed funds
rate was increased.
This is exactly what happened from February until November 1994 when, after
each 25-basis point increase in the federal funds rate, the interest rates on long-term
Treasury bonds would rise a similar amount. As I can attest, because I saw this from
the inside when I was the director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the members of the FOMC were not happy about these developments. They
rightfully interpreted these events as indicating a lack of credibility of the nominal
anchor, and decided to do something about it. Beginning with the May 17, 1994, meet-
ing, when they changed the target, they began to raise the federal funds rate target by
50 basis points in order to show that they were serious about keeping inflation under
control. Indeed, in the November 15th meeting, they raised the fed funds target by 75
basis points. It was only after this meeting that long-term rates started to come down,
indicating that the markets got the message and now were convinced that the Fed
meant business.
Contrast this behavior in the bond market with what we have seen currently.
From June 2004 until January 2005, the Fed has raised the federal funds rate target
at every meeting by 25 basis points, with the fed funds rate rising from 1 percent to 2.5
percent. Instead of rising as occurred in 1994 when the Fed started its tightening
cycle, this time long-bond rates actually fell: the ten-year rate fell from 4.6 percent at
the beginning of July 2004 to 4.2 percent in January 2005. This is really quite remarkable321 THE FED AFTER GREENSPAN
because it shows how strong the Fed’s nominal anchor has become. Raising rates is
not seen by the markets as indicating that inflation will be a problem in the future.
Instead, inflation expectations are solidly anchored so that the inflation premium in
long bonds did not increase, but if anything decreased.
Flexibility
The second key advantage of the Greenspan Fed’s approach is that it is highly
flexible. Advocates of monetary policy rules, in which monetary policy is set automati-
cally with no judgments by the monetary authorities, emphasize the discipline or
credibility they create. By adhering rigorously to a certain rule, say a Taylor rule or
the constant-money-growth rule advocated by Milton Friedman, the monetary author-
ity reassures the public that it will not engage in time-consistent, inflationary policies,
with the result that inflationary expectations remain tied down, providing the economy
with a strong nominal anchor. Critics of rules, however, have argued that any disci-
pline created by rules comes at a high cost, since a rule rigorously followed deprives
the central bank of its ability to deal with unusual or unforeseen circumstances, or
with fundamental changes in the economy.
The Fed approach has avoided the straitjacket of rules by first using all available
information to set policy, something that most rules do not do. Greenspan is famous
for sitting in a hot tub every morning, where he contemplates the data in order to
decide where he thinks the economy will be heading. He has been able to use his
judgment to set monetary policy in a way that was far more effective than if a rule like
the Taylor rule had been followed. In the mid- to late 1990s, standard economic mod-
els based on the Phillips curve were suggesting that inflation would be rising because
the unemployment rate had fallen below NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate
of Unemployment). However, despite these models’ predictions (and a forecast for
rising inflation from the Board of Governors staff), Greenspan’s judgment was that
the models were incorrect, and he persuaded the other members of the FOMC to hold
off further tightening of monetary policy.2 Greenspan was, of course, right, and it was
one reason why the Fed was able to engineer the longest expansion in U.S. history
from 1991 to 2001.
The flexibility of the Greenspan approach, which he described in a speech in August
2003 at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Conference
[Greenspan, 2003] as a “risk-management approach” to the conduct of monetary policy,
also allows the Fed to deal with concerns about financial instability. In the aftermath
of the Russian debt default and then the Long-Term Capital Management fiasco in the
fall of 1998, the Fed eased monetary policy by cutting the federal funds rate by 75 basis
points despite its “perception that the economy was expanding at a satisfactory pace
and that, even without a policy initiative, was likely to continue to do so” [Greenspan,
2003]. This easing was undertaken to make sure that the stress the financial system
was under at the time would not escalate into a severe disruption of domestic and
international financial markets. The quick action by the Fed did help reassure mar-
kets, and I agree with Greenspan’s assessment: “The product of a low-probability
event and a severe outcome, should it occur, was judged a larger threat than the pos-
sible adverse consequences of insurance that might prove necessary” [Greenspan, 2003].3322 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
WILL THE FED WORK AS WELL AFTER GREENSPAN IS GONE?
The flexible strategy of the Greenspan Fed using his “risk management approach” has
indeed worked very well, so why shouldn’t the Fed just stick with the same approach? After
all, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” However, will this approach work as well when Greenspan
is gone? There are four problems with the approach that make it far less likely that it will
produce desirable outcomes when a new chairperson of the Fed takes the helm.
Problem 1: The Nominal Anchor is Based on An Individual
The most serious problem with the Fed’s current approach is that it does not have
an explicit nominal anchor and this makes its success highly dependent on the person
who inhabits the chairmanship. As we have seen, key elements to the Fed’s success
have been Chairman Greenspan’s continual emphasis on the Fed’s commitment to
price stability and the FOMC’s pursuit of forward-looking, preemptive policies to keep
inflation under control. The Fed’s prestige and the credibility of the nominal anchor
have risen accordingly, but, as I have pointed out elsewhere [Mishkin, 2000], the
strong nominal anchor in the United States is Alan Greenspan. Unfortunately, a nomi-
nal anchor based on an individual cannot last forever. When Greenspan’s tenure at
the Fed ends, there are likely to be doubts that the new chairperson will be committed
to or as competent at pursuing the same approach. After all, we have had past chair-
men who ended up pursuing overly expansionary policy that led to inflation spinning
out of control. Both Arthur Burns and G. William Miller immediately come to mind.
Even a new chairperson who understands the importance of establishing a strong
nominal anchor and the use of forward-looking policy may find his or her credibility
being challenged. Most people don’t remember because it was so long ago, but when
Greenspan first took over as chairman, there was an “inflation scare” of the type
described by Goodfriend [1993]—a spontaneous increase in inflation fears that is reflected
in a sharp rise in long-term interest rates. The market had doubts that Greenspan,
who had strong ties with the Republican leadership, would be able to resist political
pressures and be as serious about controlling inflation as his predecessor, Paul Volcker
(see Goodfriend [2005]).
Over time, Greenspan has not only established credibility for his commitment to
keeping inflation from rising too fast, but also to taking the measures necessary to
prevent deflation from occurring. Because the new chairperson will have less credibil-
ity for reserving price stability, there is a greater possibility that negative shocks to
the economy could produce expectations of deflation, which then could trigger a defla-
tionary spiral. Indeed, this is exactly what we have seen happen in Japan when the
Bank of Japan was headed by Masuro Hayami: it encountered “deflation scares,” in
which spontaneous fears of deflation triggered sharp declines in long-term interest
rates [Kuttner and Posen, 2004].
Greenspan’s political skills have also helped produce an unusually good working
relationship between the Fed and the executive branch, which started with the Clinton
administration. If the new chairperson does not have Greenspan’s political skills, the
Fed might face strong pressure to engage in over-expansionary policies, thereby weak-
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Problem 2: Focus on the Long-Run May Weaken
The public debate on monetary policy in the United States still has a tendency to
focus on short-run considerations, as reflected in politicians’ focus on “jobs, jobs, jobs”
when discussing monetary policy during political campaigns. Greenspan’s public state-
ments also emphasize that the Fed has a responsibility to stabilize the business cycle,
which is consistent with the dual mandate for the Fed, which is embodied in legisla-
tion and commits the Fed to pursue both high employment and price stability goals.
Greenspan, however, has been successful in getting the public and the politicians to
understand that stabilization of the business cycle should not interfere with the price
stability objective in the long run and that successful stabilization requires a forward-
looking policy with a longer-run focus. Greenspan’s success in moving the public and
the politicians’ focus to the long run, however, does depend on their high regard for
him. Given politicians’ incentives to focus on the short run and the high employment
goal in the dual mandate and the fact that a new chairperson will certainly have less
stature than Greenspan, at least at first, increased pressure on the Fed to focus on the
short-run issue of jobs, jobs, jobs is highly likely. This outcome could make it harder
for the Fed to be preemptive and forward looking, which has been so critical to its
success. In addition, an increased shorter-run focus is likely to produce increased
pressure for overly expansionary policy that would increase the likelihood that the
time-inconsistency problem of Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Calvo [1978] would
become more serious in the future. In the past, after a successful period of low infla-
tion, the Federal Reserve has reverted to inflationary monetary policy—late 1960s
and 1970s are one example—and without an explicit nominal anchor that preserves a
long-run focus, this could certainly happen again in the future.
Problem 3: Lack of Transparency of Goals Increases Uncertainty
The Greenspan Fed has made tremendous progress on the transparency front,
but in one regard it is opaque: its nominal anchor is not explicit because it has not
announced a numerical goal for inflation. Because the Fed has not been more explicit
about its nominal anchor, there is a constant guessing game about the Fed’s goals,
which creates unnecessary volatility in financial markets and arouses uncertainty
among producers and the general public. This was illustrated by the recent sharp
swings in long-term interest rates during the late spring and summer of 2003. Because
the market was confused about the Fed’s mixed signals on the risk of deflation and
what the Fed might do, the ten-year bond rate first dropped from a level near 4 per-
cent at the beginning of May to 3.2 percent in the middle of June and then rose over
100 basis points to 4.5 percent by the end of July. If the markets had a clearer picture
of the Fed’s longer-run objectives, particularly on inflation, then they would focus less
on what the Fed’s next policy move would be, making it less likely that Fed state-
ments or policy moves would lead to whipsawing of the market. This problem would
likely get worse when a new chairperson comes on board because markets could not
be sure that the new chairperson might have very different objectives than Greenspan.324 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Problem 4: Lack of Accountability could Weaken the Fed’s Independence
Unlike most government agencies, the Fed controls its own purse strings and has
the right to conduct policy independently of the government. This independence enables
the Fed to resist political pressures to pursue overly expansionary policy in order to
create jobs in the short run, thus helping the Fed to avoid falling into the time-
inconsistency trap. The fact that monetary policy needs to be forward looking in order
to take account of the long lags in the effect of monetary policy on inflation provides
another rationale for Fed independence. Independence insulates the Fed from the
myopia that is frequently a feature of the political process arising from politicians’
concerns about getting elected in the near future. Independence therefore helps the
Fed to focus more on the long run and therefore be forward looking and adequately
allow for the long lags from monetary policy actions to inflation in setting its policy
instruments. Indeed, recent evidence seems to support the conjecture that macroeco-
nomic performance is improved when central banks are more independent. When
central banks in industrialized countries are ranked from least legally independent to
most legally independent, the inflation performance is found to be the best for coun-
tries with the most independent central banks.4
Lack of transparency of the Fed’s goals leads to a lack of accountability that can
weaken support for the Fed’s independence, which we have argued above is highly
beneficial. A basic principle of democracy is that the public should have the right to
control the actions of the government. Yet the practical economic arguments for cen-
tral bank independence coexist uneasily with the presumption that government poli-
cies should be made democratically, rather than by an elite group. Central bank inde-
pendence, however, is likely to garnish more support if the politicians and the public
can evaluate the central bank’s performance and thus have the capability to make
incompetent policy makers’ lives miserable. However, the Fed’s lack of explicit goals
makes it harder for the Congress and the general public to hold an independent Fed
accountable because there are no predetermined criteria for judging its performance.
With the high regard that the public and politicians have for Greenspan, this lack
of accountability has not been a serious problem for the Fed. Support for the Fed’s
independence is strong because of the trust we have in Greenspan. No matter how
competent the next chairperson is, it will take time before he or she engenders a
similar trust. Then the Fed’s lack of accountability could come back to haunt it.
It was not that long ago that there were pretty strong attacks on the Fed’s inde-
pendence. For example, in 1996 Senators Dorgan and Reid, who were unhappy with
the Fed’s past tightening of interest rates, which they felt were too high, called for the
Congress to take over budgetary authority over the nonmonetary activities of the
Federal Reserve to curb its independence. Before them, Henry Gonzalez, the chairman
of the House Banking Committee, was a regular critic of the Fed and wanted Congress
to assert more control over its actions. Although attacks on the Fed have quieted down
in recent years, they certainly could arise again if the new chairperson does not gar-
ner the same respect as Greenspan.325 THE FED AFTER GREENSPAN
WHERE SHOULD THE FEDERAL RESERVE HEAD AFTER GREENSPAN?
I have argued that although the successful strategy of the Greenspan Fed is far
from broken, it is less likely to be as successful in the future. All would probably be
well if we could clone Alan Greenspan, but of course this is in the realm of science
fiction. In addition, because the chairmanship of the Fed is a political appointment and
is up to the President, we cannot even contemplate succession planning and specify
who would be the perfect person to succeed Greenspan. An alternative approach is to
specify institutional changes that would make the Fed more likely to be able to con-
tinue the successes it has had under Greenspan, no matter who the next chairperson
is. The following recommendations follow from the analysis above.
The Fed Should Move toward a Flexible Inflation-Targeting Regime by
Announcing an Explicit, Numerical, Long-Run Target for Inflation
A flexible form of inflation targeting has many of the desirable features of the
current Fed approach. It is forward looking, uses all information in deciding on the
setting of policy instruments and does focus on achieving long-run price stability.
However, it goes beyond the current Fed approach, enabling it to provide solutions to
the four problems outlined in the previous section.
Announcement of an explicit, long-run, numerical inflation goal for monetary policy
would institutionalize the Fed’s commitment to price stability and make it less depen-
dent on whom the next chairperson of the Fed would be, thereby enhancing the credibil-
ity of the nominal anchor. Announcement of an explicit, numerical target also makes it
clear that the Fed will have a long-run focus, making it clear that it will continue to be
forward looking and will take the necessary steps to keep inflation under control.
Indeed, announcement of an explicit inflation target is likely to shift the public
debate to focus more on the long-run rather than on the short-run issue of “jobs, jobs,
jobs” as in the U.S. This is exactly what has occurred in countries that have adopted
inflation targeting, with an extraordinary example having occurred in Canada in 1996
(see Mishkin and Posen [1997] and Bernanke et al. [1999]). At that time, which was
five years after Canada had adopted inflation targeting, the president of the Canadian
Economic Association made a speech criticizing the Bank of Canada for pursuing
monetary policy that he claimed was too contractionary. His speech sparked off a wide-
spread public debate. Instead of degenerating into calls for the immediate expansion
of monetary policy with little reference to the long-run consequences of such a policy
change, the debate was channeled into a substantive discussion over what should be
the appropriate target for inflation, with both the Bank and its critics obliged to make
explicit their assumptions and estimates of the costs and benefits of different levels of
inflation. Indeed, the debate and the Bank of Canada’s record and responsiveness led
to increased support for the Bank of Canada, with the result that criticism of the
Bank and its conduct of monetary policy was not a major issue in the 1997 elections
as it had been before the 1993 elections.
By changing the public debate on what a central bank can do in the long-run—that
is, control inflation—rather than on what it cannot do, which is permanently increase
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pressure on the Fed to pursue short-run objectives would decrease, making it less
likely that the Fed would be pressured into the time-inconsistency trap of trying to
expand output and employment in the short run by pursuing overly expansionary
monetary policy, with the outcome being too much inflation.
Because an inflation target is readily understood by the public and is thus highly
transparent, framing the discussion of monetary policy around an inflation goal would
make it easier for the Fed to communicate with the public and the markets, thereby
decreasing uncertainty about future monetary policy moves. The resulting decrease in
uncertainty would help decrease market volatility, helping to prevent the whipsawing
in the bond market of the type that occurred in the late spring and summer of 2003.
Because an explicit numerical inflation target increases the accountability of the cen-
tral bank, inflation targeting is also more consistent with democratic principles. The
public and politicians can now more easily monitor whether the Fed is achieving its goals.
Sustained success in the conduct of monetary policy as measured against a pre-announced
and well-defined inflation target can be instrumental in building public support for a cen-
tral bank’s independence and for its policies. The granting of operational independence to
the Bank of England in 1997 illustrates this point.5 On May 6, 1997, the new Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced that the Bank of England would henceforth
have the responsibility for setting interest rates, which previously was done by the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer. In the press conference, Gordon Brown explained that the infla-
tion-targeting regime justified the government’s decision: the Bank had demonstrated
successful performance over time, as measured against an announced clear target, and
was now more accountable, making it more responsive to political oversight.
The Fed Should Make Clear that Announcement of a Long-Run Inflation
Target is Consistent with its Dual Mandate
The Fed currently operates under a dual mandate in which it directed to pursue
both high employment and price stability goals. For the foreseeable future it is very
unlikely that the Congress would change this mandate, and any move toward an
inflation-targeting regime in the United States would have to be consistent with this
mandate. Indeed, the literature on optimal monetary policy supports a dual mandate
because it typically specifies an objective function for monetary policy which puts a
negative weight on both output as well as inflation fluctuations (for example, see the
papers in Taylor [1999]). As has been argued by Ben Bernanke [2004], who at the time
was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and Larry Meyer
[2004b], then a past governor, announcement of a long-run target for inflation is fully
consistent with the dual mandate. Both Bernanke and Meyer advocate announcement
of a long-run target, which Bernanke has referred to as the optimal long-run inflation
target (OLIR), which should be achieved on average over the business cycle. Both
point out that this would leave the Fed sufficient flexibility to deal with business cycle
fluctuations and financial instability.
The Fed would need to make clear that announcing a long-run inflation target can
actually make it easier for it to pursue a dual mandate and minimize output fluctua-
tions as well as keep inflation under control. First, as both Ben Bernanke and I have
emphasized in our previous writings [Bernanke et al., 1999; Bernanke, 2004; Ito and327 THE FED AFTER GREENSPAN
Mishkin, 2004], the Fed should indicate that its concerns about output fluctuations
require it to set its long-run inflation target above zero (even after correcting for any
measurement bias) because doing so provides insurance against deflation, which can
be costly either because deflation leads to financial instability [Mishkin, 1991; 1997] or
because it makes it more likely that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
may occur, which makes expansionary monetary policy less effective.
The Fed can further explain that it cares about reducing output fluctuations by em-
phasizing that monetary policy needs to be just as vigilant in preventing inflation from
falling too low as it is from preventing it from being too high. It can do this by explaining
that an explicit inflation target helps the monetary authorities stabilize the economy
because it can be more aggressive in easing monetary policy in the face of negative de-
mand shocks to the economy without being concerned that this will cause a blowout in
inflation expectations. However, in order to keep the communication strategy clear, the
explanation of a monetary policy easing in the face of negative demand shocks needs to
indicate that it is completely consistent with the preservation of price stability.
A classic example of the benefits of an inflation target in preventing a decline in
output occurred in Australia in July 1997 when the Reserve Bank of Australia lowered
interest rates immediately after the currency crisis in Thailand which brought on the
East Asian crisis. Despite the prospects of a substantial depreciation of the Australian
dollar, the Reserve Bank believed that the presence of its inflation target meant that
inflation expectations would not rise above the targets with a monetary policy easing,
and it could ease to counter the negative demand shock arising from the deterioration
in the terms of trade resulting from the East Asian crisis.
The Fed should also emphasize that an inflation target makes it more likely that
central banks will be aggressive in combating negative shocks, so that deflationary
spirals are less likely. If the Bank of Japan had an inflation target with the appropriate
emphasis on the floor of the target range, then it is very likely that it would have
avoided the disastrous policies pursued under the leadership of Masuro Hayami and
would have been far more expansionary [Ito and Mishkin, 2004]. Also, it would have
been far more likely to avoid the time-inconsistency problem outlined by Eggertsson
[2003], in which the Bank of Japan was unable to commit to a long-run policy of
expansion, thereby making temporary expansionary policy ineffective.
In addition, central banks can also clarify that they care about reducing output
fluctuations by indicating that when the economy is very far below any reasonable
measure of potential output, they will take expansionary actions to stimulate eco-
nomic recovery. In this case, measurement error of potential output is likely to be
swamped by the size of the output gap, so it is far clearer that expansionary policy is
appropriate and that inflation is unlikely to rise from such actions. In this situation,
the case for taking actions to close the output gap is much stronger and does not
threaten the credibility of the central bank in its pursuit of price stability.
The Fed Should Eventually Move Toward a Full-Fledged, Inflation-
Targeting Regime, but One that is Highly Flexible
I see the announcement of a long-run inflation target as being the first step to
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announcing an inflation target over the intermediate term, with more information
provided about the desired path of inflation that the Fed would like to achieve on its
way to the long-run target. The Fed should emphasize that going farther in the direc-
tion of full-fledged inflation targeting would continue to be consistent with the dual
mandate because it would be highly flexible and therefore would be best described as
“constrained discretion” [Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997]. Indeed, constrained discre-
tion is what inflation-targeting central banks have actually done, and they have found,
if anything, that output fluctuations have decreased rather than increased (see
Bernanke et al. [1999]).
One important mistake that the Fed should avoid is adopting a fixed horizon for
its inflation target of, say, two years, with the Bank of England being a prominent
example.6 Critics of inflation targeting, most notably Don Kohn [2004], who is member
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, rightfully worry that a fixed horizon
for the inflation target may be too rigid and result in suboptimal monetary policy.
Models such as Svensson [1997] and Woodford [2004] tell us that optimal monetary
policy will surely adjust the target horizon and path for inflation depending on the
nature and persistence of shocks. The use of a specific horizon like two years, which is
consistent with estimates of policy lags from monetary policy actions to inflation, has
not been a problem for inflation targeting in advanced economies like the United
Kingdom only because inflation has not been subject to big shocks so that it has
remained close to the target level. However, as Svensson [1997] demonstrates, if the
inflation rate is shocked away from its long-run target, then the target horizon should
be longer than the policy horizon of, say, two years.
How this could be done has been illustrated by recent actions taken by the Brazil-
ian central bank [Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella, 2003]. Brazil experienced a major
exchange rate shock in 2002 because of concerns that the likely winner in the presi-
dential election would pursue populist policies that would lead to currency deprecia-
tion. The resulting depreciation then led to a substantial overshoot of the Brazilian
inflation target. In January 2003, the Banco Central do Brasil announced a procedure
for how it would modify its inflation targets. First, the central bank estimated the
regulated-price shock to be 1.7 percent. Then, taking into account the nature and
persistence of the shocks, it estimated the inertia from past shocks to be 4.2 percent,
of which 2/3 was to be accepted, resulting in a further adjustment of 2.8 percent. Then
the central bank added these two numbers to the previously announced target of 4
percent to get an adjusted target for 2003 of 8.5 percent (= 4 percent + 1.7 percent +
2.8 percent). The central bank then announced the adjusted target in an open letter
sent to the Minister of Finance in January 2003, which explained that getting to the
non-adjusted target of 4 percent too quickly would entail far too high a loss of output.
Specifically, the announcement indicated that an attempt to achieve an inflation rate
of 6.5 percent in 2003 would be expected to entail a decline of 1.6 percent of GDP,
while trying to achieve the previous target of 4 percent would be expected to lead to an
even larger decline of GDP of 7.3 percent.
By announcing that they would do what the Brazilians have done if a situation
arose in which inflation were shocked substantially away from the long-run goal, the
Fed could make it clear that the horizon for inflation targets needs to be flexible and
will vary depending on the nature and persistence of shocks. In addition, by discussing329 THE FED AFTER GREENSPAN
how they would modify the inflation path to get to the long-run goal more slowly in
order not to have too great a loss of output, the Fed could not only emphasize its
flexibility but also that it has an appropriate concern about output fluctuations, as the
dual mandate requires. Nonetheless, it will still be able to assure the public that it
continues to worry about the long-run and the importance of achieving price stability.
The Fed should be Wary of Pushing Transparency Too Far
I have been arguing for a further increase in Federal Reserve transparency by
having it adopt an explicit, numerical inflation target. Indeed, we have seen that the
Fed under Greenspan has greatly increased its transparency. However, there is one
element of Fed transparency that I believe has gone too far.
The recent Federal Reserve experience with the language of its post-FOMC state-
ment illustrates the problem of the public not understanding that projected policy
paths are conditional on the evolution of the data. In order to underscore its commit-
ment to preventing a deflationary spiral from getting underway in the United States,
the FOMC announced in August 2003 that it would maintain policy accommodation,
that is, a 1 percent federal funds rate target, for a “considerable period.” As Eggertsson
and Woodford [2003] have shown, a commitment to keeping the policy rate unusually
low beyond the time when the economy begins to recover is an important policy tool
to deal with deflationary shocks. Since then, the Fed has continued to specify its
intentions for its policy rate, with the FOMC modifying its language in January 2004 to
say that it would be “patient” in removing policy accommodation and then in May 2004 to
say that policy accommodation would be removed at a pace that is likely to be “measured.”
Although there are those like Lars Svensson [2002] who strongly advocate that
central banks should announce projections of the future path of the policy rate as the
Fed has been doing recently, announcing its intentions about the setting of future
policy rates has the potential to complicate the Fed’s communication with the public.
Although economists understand that any policy path projected by the Fed is inher-
ently conditional because changes in the state of the economy will necessarily require
a change in the policy path, the public is far less likely to understand this. When new
information comes in and the Fed central bank changes the policy rate from its pro-
jected path, the public may see this as a reneging on its announced policy or an indica-
tion that the central bank’s previous policy settings were a mistake. Thus, even when
the central bank is conducting its policy in an optimal manner, deviations from its
projected policy path may be viewed as a central bank failure and could hurt the
central bank’s credibility.
In addition, the deviations of the policy rate from its projected path might be seen
as flip-flops on the part of the central bank. As we often see in political campaigns—
and this was particularly true of the recent presidential campaign—when a candidate
changes his position even if it reflects changes in circumstances and thus reflects
sound judgment, the candidate is vulnerable to attacks by his or her opponents that
he or she does not have leadership qualities. Wouldn’t the Fed be subject to the same
criticism when changing circumstances would force it to change the policy rate from
its previously projected path? The result might be a weakening of support for the
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So far I think that the Fed has gotten pretty lucky with its language outlining the
future path of monetary policy. Once the deflation threat was over, it was no longer
necessary for the Fed to continue its commitment to monetary policy accommodation.
In the first half of 2004, inflation heated up and many commentators were concerned
that the Fed was getting behind the curve and would have to raise the federal funds
rate at a much faster rate than its announced path. Indeed, long-term bond rates
climbed close to 100 basis points, a mini inflation scare, indicating that fears about
future higher inflation were beginning to take hold. It looked like the Fed might have
to raise rates at a much more rapid pace then they had announced in order to keep
inflation under control. If this had happened, I suspect that Fed would have come
under substantial attack, especially given that the presidential campaign was ongo-
ing, with nasty accusations of flip-flopping. As it turned out, inflation remained be-
nign, and the Fed’s sticking to its announced path has not led to inflation expectations
getting out of control, with the result that long bond rates have come back down
again. My mother always told me it’s better to be lucky than good. But I think it is a
mistake for the Fed always to count on being lucky.
The Fed’s experiment with announcing the path of the future monetary policy worked
out reasonably well, but except under very unusual circumstances when there is a serious
threat of deflation, it has the potential to turn out badly.8 If the Fed had to deviate from its
announced policy path, it would have led to a loss of credibility and a weakening of the
support for its policies and independence. Although I have advocated more transparency
for the Fed in terms of announcing an inflation target, I believe that transparency can go
too far if it means announcing a projection for the future policy path.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The key challenge facing the Fed after Greenspan leaves is how to lock in the
Greenspan legacy of low and stable inflation. I have argued that depending on the next
chairperson to be as trusted and competent as Alan Greenspan would be a mistake.
Instead of putting our trust in individuals, I believe that we need to design institutions
so that we do not need “maestros” to get good policy outcomes. I have argued that
instituting the type of inflation-targeting regime described above can provide the Fed
with an institutional framework that will help it continue its recent stellar perfor-
mance even when Greenspan goes on to his well-earned retirement.
NOTES
Presidential address at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, New York, March 4, 2005.
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia Univer-
sity or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1. The so-called Taylor curve first outlined in Taylor [1979].
2. Estrella and Mishkin [1999] argue that because so many other factors drive the inflation process,
using the standard NAIRU concept to determine the setting of monetary policy instruments can
lead to costly mistakes.
3. However, I do think that it was a mistake for the Fed not to take away this insurance by raising the
fed funds rate by 75 basis points to get it back up to its previous level once the financial markets
had stabilized several months later.331 THE FED AFTER GREENSPAN
4. For example, see Alesina and Summers [1993], Cukierman [1992], and Fischer [1994]. However,
there is some question as to whether causality runs from central bank independence to low
inflation or, rather, whether a third factor is involved, such as the general public’s preferences for
low inflation that create both central bank independence and low inflation [Posen, 1995].
5. Again, see Mishkin and Posen [1997] and Bernanke et al. [1999] for a discussion of this episode.
6. Officials at the Bank of England, however, are well aware that the fixed horizon would have to be
modified if shocks to inflation send it outside the plus or minus one percent band around the
target. If this happened, the Bank has to provide an explanation to the government of not only
why it missed the target, but also the desired path for inflation that would bring it back down to the
target. In this situation, it is highly likely that the Bank would advocate a horizon of more than two
years for inflation to return to the target. As I see it, the problem with the Bank of England
approach is not that it would not have a flexible horizon when it was needed, but that the two-year
horizon has become embedded in the minds of the public because the Bank has not made it clear
enough that the horizon would be flexible when necessary.
7. Another problem with a central bank announcing its policy projection, raised by Goodhart [2001]
and Mishkin [2004] is that it could complicate the decision making process of the committee that
makes monetary policy decisions.
8. As is indicated in Ito and Mishkin [2004], I do believe that deflationary environments, like the one we
see in Japan, are sufficiently damaging that a commitment to a policy path, specifically a zero interest
rate policy (ZIRP), for an extended period is needed to reflate the economy. However, the cost of a
commitment to a projected policy rate path is trickier when the deflation risks are not as serious.
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